Prerequisites to a Resilient EU Defense Integration
Mahmoud Javadi, YSC Fellow 2024
Since 2008, the European Union has faced a series of profound crises, earning the label of a “long crisis decade” (Ferrera et al., 2024). Jean Monnet’s maxim about Europe being shaped by crises may resonate with the EU’s recent challenges, particularly highlighted by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This event has emphasized the need for resilient European defense integration, as ongoing threats to the liberal international order (LIO) make it increasingly necessary. Public and elite sentiment support this necessity, prompting numerous proposals for defense reforms. This article aims to contribute to this ongoing conversation by fine tuning two closely linked prerequisites to such integration: EU-owned military-industrial complex and EU-led defense governance. As the former enhances EU readiness in defense, the latter empowers the Union to strategically engage in crucial defense areas like EU-wide procurement without undermining the national sovereignty of EU member states.
(c) Andrew Lockwood on Pixabay
Geopolitical Necessity and Public Support
During the long crisis decade, it took four years for the EU to reach a broad consensus on the debt crisis, four months on the refugee crisis, four weeks on the Covid crisis, and four days on the Ukraine crisis. The latter, notably, has profoundly influenced the EU’s strategic thinking, prompting a decisive shift towards bolstering defense investments as an initial measure. EU defense expenditure soared to a historic high of €270bn in 2023 (Barron’s, 2023). However, while this spending is imperative, it remains insufficient to bridge significant capability gaps (Besch, 2024).
The war in Ukraine has starkly reminded EU leaders that, despite being a crucial component, financing defense is not the sole vital aspect of the broader EU security framework. The EU-led consensus in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has emboldened the Union to pave the way for EU defense integration – an aspiration that aligns with, yet surpasses, the realms of both the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defense Policy (Rodrigues, 2024).
European publics overwhelmingly endorse this aspiration. A February 2024 survey of 13,000 EU citizens revealed significant backing for a unified EU defense policy, with 87 percent in favor, reflecting a striking balance across diverse political leanings (Hoffmann and de Vries, 2024). Surprising findings also emerged from a March 2024 survey of 26,000 EU citizens, exhibiting that nearly half advocate for consolidating military powers, with more than one third of even the most Eurosceptic voters advocating for prioritizing a common defense policy within the EU framework (Schickler, 2024).
Furthermore, longitudinal research indicates a consistently strong, albeit moderate, positive correlation between perceptions of international threats and support for European security and defense integration (Mader et al., 2023). Another research has posited that such robust support has remained stable over time, suggesting that people’s attitudes are unlikely to change significantly upon learning the specifics of European defense integration plans (Schilde et al., 2019).
Public support for EU defense integration resonates within EU leadership. In 2023, then President of the European Council, Charles Michel, emphasized the imperative for the EU to progress towards a defense single market (European Council, 2023), while a year later, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen advocated for the inclusion of a dedicated defense commissioner in the next European Commission (2024–2029) (European Commission, 2024b). Research into the positioning of European parties and groups regarding EU defense integration ahead of the 2024 European elections revealed a spectrum of alignment, indicating widespread recognition of the necessity for European defense integration (Fiott, 2024).
The favorable stance of both EU citizens and leaders towards expanding the Union’s involvement in defense sectors underscores the imperative for the EU to champion defense integration despite an anticipated pushback from certain European capitals. The success of such an endeavor, however, hinges upon the formation of an EU-led military-industrial complex and EU-led defense governance.
A Path Towards EU Defense Integration
Defense remains firmly within the exclusive national competence of EU member states, making the transition to an EU-level competency realistically unattainable, even in the long term. However, the Ukraine war has underscored the imperative for European leaders to recognize that the EU must move beyond mere financial contributions and other comparatively less effective measures in deterring a Russian aggression.
The genuine significance of EU funding for defense capabilities resides in the creation of a resilient military-industrial complex. March 2024 marked the introduction of the first-ever European Defense Industrial Strategy (EDIS) at the EU level (European Commission 2024a). This strategy aims to bolster the competitiveness and preparedness of the defense industry, thereby paving the way for an EU-led military-industrial complex.
While EDIS has its imperfections, such as underfunding and lack of clear procedures, it does not preclude the possibility of reform and evolution towards establishing a strong and resilient EU-led military-industrial complex. However, a pertinent question remains: would directing EU defense funding toward the EU led military-industrial complex suffice for the aspiration of EU defense integration?
The EU presently functions as both a forum and a force for coordinating the defense policies of its member states. Initiatives like EDIS seek to further solidify the EU’s footprints, but they are often viewed primarily as financial backers. Given the ongoing military conflict in Ukraine and other pressing security challenges, there is a clear need for the EU to move beyond its role as a funder and take on a ‘governor’ role in matters of defense and security.
With no need for amending the Lisbon Treaty, the role of a governor does not entail the relinquishment of national defense sovereignty to the EU. Rather, it would serve as an intermediary between the formulation of national defense policies and their coordination. This role could be initially trialed by granting the EU governing authority over procurement, a step beyond mere fund allocation for procurement. Additionally, the EU could spearhead efforts to integrate the endeavors of national bureaucracies in bolstering Europe’s emerging defense industrial outlook and base (Bergmann, 2024).
The devil lies in the details of the ‘governor’ role. Nonetheless, such a function, for instance, could effectively prevent erroneous procurements like those experienced by the Czech Republic and Slovakia, who inadvertently purchased armored vehicles from Sweden with varying gun calibers, rendering the new systems incompatible with each other (Szumski, 2023).
The painful lessons of the Ukraine war underscore the urgent need for a resilient EU-led defense integration. However, clinging to outdated mindsets from the 1990s or 2000s cannot offer a viable solution to the existential security crises of the 2020s. If defense integration is to be achieved, viewing the EU merely as a financial contributor will not suffice.
For effective management of security crises now and in the future, the EU must possess a robust defense budget and industrial base, while also assuming a more substantial governance role in specific areas of defense and military affairs. Without this, the EU and its member states risk squandering time but also further compromising their already declining global standing.
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This article was written as part of the YSC Fellowship 2024. For more information on this year’s fellow programme head here.
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