Deconstructing the Franco-German Engine
Tobias Sauer, YSC Fellow 2024
The supposed crisis of Franco-German relations invokes all kinds of expressive metaphors. Amongst these, the “Franco-German engine” seems to be an all-time favorite. Describing an almost mechanical dynamic between France and Germany which provides the thrust for ever advancing EU integration, some analyses confuse the metaphor with an actual process. This leads to misguided expectations and consequently, counterproductive recommendations on how to fix the Franco-German relations. It is time to deconstruct the engine to see which parts are working, where it is malfunctioning, and how it could be repaired.
(c) LittleVisuals on Pixabay
It’s not the Engine, it’s the Driver(s)
To political scientists, the Franco-German engine is as much a myth as it is a catchy slogan. In fact, some quantitative assessments find little evidence for its existence (Selck & Kaeding, 2004). But why then, is it such a prominently featured expression in the debate? Academic literature assessing the impact of the Franco-German tandem on European Integration draws from the notion of leadership (Pedersen, 1998; Bertelsmann Foundation, 2002; Jabko, 2001; Pollack, 2003; Janning, 2005; Ludlow, 2005; Hewel, 2006; Tallberg, 2006; Beach and Mazzucelli, 2007; Lübkemeier, 2007; Hayward, 2008; Surel, 2008; Schild, 2010, Tömmel & Verdun, 2017). Consequently, the Franco-German potential to lead its European neighbors to increased integration is conceptualized as a function of (1) the compatibility between political strategies of the respective political leaders, (2) the formal and informal power resources of France and Germany, (3) the institutional environment in Brussels, and (4) the constellations and coalition patterns in the Council of the European Union (Schild, 2010).
While the current debates tend to overemphasize the personal disagreements between President Macron and Chancellor Scholz, they are considerable. In Schild’s framework this corresponds to the compatibility of political strategies. In fact, there is explicit disagreement between Berlin and Paris on important and pressing strategic choices. Most notably, the German Zeitenwende relied heavily on purchases from US-American defense companies, instead of investing into the European defense industry (Zandee & Ellison, 2024, p. 11). On the contrary, France wanted to strengthen the latter, even if that would have meant longer waiting lists (Grand, 2023). Additionally, there seems to be a personal animosity between President Macron and Chancellor Scholz, which is not helping to resolve these disagreements (Carstens & Wyssuwa, 2024). Even in areas where the political leadership is aligned, it does not provide sufficient guidance to resolve the endless tug of war over the geographical distribution of production sites and underlying military requirements for the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) and the Main Ground Combat System (MGCS) (Möhring, 2023).
Disagreements: The Fuel of the Franco-German Engine
However, we should be cautious to overestimate the impact of personal discord and not reduce the power of the Franco-German engine to a single dimension. The complex nature of the policy making processes in the EU often invites overly simplistic people-centric explanations. For instance, Merkel and Sarkozy were slandered as “Europe’s odd couple” before their legacy of exceptional German-French cooperation was historicized under the nickname “Merkozy” (Erlanger, 2011). Rather, proper analysis needs to consider relational (2), institutional (3), and structural (4) factors. Additionally, the existence of disagreements between both countries does not obstruct the engine per se. Cooperation, as opposed to harmony, evolves out of active efforts to adjust policies or behavior to the anticipated preferences of others (Keohane, 1984). It arises from a configuration of discord. Hence, the existence of Franco-German disagreements does not automatically hobble the Franco-German engine, rather, they are its fuel.
A good example for this can be found in the coordination of the EU’s Common Security and Foreign Policy (CFSP) towards Libya. Macron initially backed the forces of Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar against the EU- and UN-supported Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli (Taylor, 2019). He reconsidered France’s position after the Turkish intervention on behalf of the GNA in 2020 and threw his weight behind the Berlin Conference on Libya, which tried to limit foreign involvement in the conflict (Momtaz, 2020). This allowed Germany to build a compromise around formerly conflictual positions of member states towards the conflict in Libya and pacify it at least temporarily. This pattern also holds true for milestones in the European integration process. Counter-intuitively, Franco-German cooperation is especially likely to be adopted by other EU members, if they arise from an original discord between the tandem (Leuffen et al., 2013). Hence, the question is not whether disagreements exist but how fast they can be brought to a consensus.
Next Destination: EU Enlargement?
This also applies to the next important milestone in European integration: The Eastern EU Enlargement. At the heart of these discussions lies the future decision-making system in a Council with more than 27 members. Especially CFSP decisions, which require a consensus amongst all member states, are already contested. Recently, Hungary’s Victor Orban used his veto against the establishment of further sanctions against Russia to extract concessions (Jack, 2023). The underlying collective action problem would only be exacerbated with additional members. Hence, a reform is seen as a vital prerogative to ensure the future of a capable and “geopolitical” EU (European Commission, 2018).
In this regard, Germany and France are already testing waters. If the enlargement brings about institutional and structural changes, the future performance of the Franco-German Engine will depend on them just as much as consensus finding between the partners. A recent report by the Franco-German Jacques Delors research institute, which was commissioned by both governments, argued for the introduction of qualified majority voting (QMV) on CFSP decisions (Report of the Franco-German Working Group on the EU Institutional Reform, 2023). Irrespective of the exact procedure presented in the report, this change in decision making is important in that it would deprive single member states of their vetoes. Naturally, this change would create opposition not between France and Germany, but between big and small EU members.
This relates to the reason why small countries see a benefit in joining the EU. It allows them to punch far above their weight by influencing the policy of a far bigger block than themselves. Regarding the CFSP towards Libya, for example, Malta was able to veto any common EU position on the conflict that posed a threat to its individual interests (Martin, 2020). The Franco-German proposal for QMV procedures in CFSP decisions would stop Malta or Hungary from engaging in this kind of “egoistic” behavior. However, its introduction would necessitate a treaty change, which again has to be consensual. France and Germany would thus have to convince smaller members to accept further constraints on the exercise of their sovereignty. But given the recent results of European Parliament elections there seems to be little appetite for such reforms - even amongst French and Germans.
European Lubricant for a Spluttering Franco-German Engine
Hence, the future of European Integration does not fundamentally hinge on the disagreements between France and Germany. The most important next step will rely on France’s and Germany’s ability to reform their institutional environment in the EU and to find a consensus with the smaller members on how to make enlargement work. To do this, both countries will have to leverage their formal and informal power resources and create favorable coalitions to change the institutional setting of policy making processes altogether. In light of this much bigger challenge, smaller issues regarding defense industry policy (like FCAS and MGCS) persist. They are by no means marginal, but also do not represent irreconcilable stakes. The increased pressure on Ukraine due to a lack of ammunition has already seen a French shift towards pragmatism when France accepted the Czech initiative to buy non-European ammunition (Nussbaum et al., 2024). Taking this as a model to return to the original metaphor, the Franco-German engine might need some European lubricant to stop spluttering. After all, Franco-German cooperation is void without its European neighbors.
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This article was written as part of the YSC Fellowship 2024. For more information on this year’s fellow programme head here.
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