The Future of Europe's Nuclear Deterrence: Strategic Necessity or Unmanageable Risk?
Agata Bidas & Miguel Reyes Castro, YSC Fellows 2024
Recent statements by former US President and current Republican Party presidential candidate Donald Trump on the future US commitment to NATO and European security have sent shockwaves across the Atlantic. Trump's expressed irritation at NATO members and his desire to "encourage" Vladimir Putin to attack European alliance members have raised urgent concerns (Joyner 2024). These concerns have led to calls for Europe to establish its own "nuclear deterrent" (Der Spiegel 2024; Hanke Vela/Camut 2024; Joyner 2024; Lindner 2024).
The potential return of Donald Trump to the White House in 2025 has further intensified concerns and discussions around the future of European security and deterrence. Given his previous remarks and actions, the possibility of a Trump presidency has become a significant point of contention in European political, diplomatic, and security circles (Brzozowski 2024; Hanke Vela/Camut 2024; Joyner 2024). In this debate, two crucial, interlinked questions have stood out: how should the EU approach the issue of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence? And will a new European security framework lead to the proliferation of atomic weapons, or are there alternative paths? This essay will address these questions through a qualitative analysis arguing that the best and less contentious option for Europe is to continue to invest in conventional defense and deterrence. This conclusion is underpinned by the notion that nuclear deterrence carries a series of political, legal, and technical-operational complications.
(c) Picture from Svetlozar Hristov on Pixabay
Security Challenges
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, coupled with subsequent nuclear threats from Vladimir Putin, has exposed the EU's unpreparedness for a potential military conflict within Europe. Furthermore, the crisis has underscored the EU's reliance on the United States for its defense, including nuclear deterrence. The concerns around Trump's return to the White House and the fragility of European deterrence have led to discussions within the EU about developing a nuclear deterrent to strengthen its strategic autonomy and reduce this reliance on the US.
Some proposals that could bolster EU security through nuclear means have been put forward.. Various proposals have been raised by European experts and politicians, such as a trilateral British-French-German nuclear umbrella to enhance the role of European states within the NATO framework and French President Macron's proposal to incorporate the French nuclear arsenal into a European structure (Lanxade et al. 2023; Hanke Vela/Camut 2024).
However, the EU's position on nuclear deterrence is far from united. Firstly, all EU member states adhere to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which aims to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and facilitate cooperation between nuclear and non-nuclear states (Ahmatović 2024). Moreover, the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017, which completely bans the possession of nuclear weapons, has only strengthened these divisions. Austria, Malta, and Ireland supported the treaty, while France and most of the EU member states, which are also NATO member states, opposed it (Onderčo/Portela 2022).
Furthermore, Sweden and Finland, which were previously neutral on military alliances, decided to seek NATO membership in light of the growing threat from Russia, making a significant shift in their defense policies (Portela 2023). These divisions and shifts in policy underscore the potential risks and complexities of future-proofing Europe’s nuclear deterrence.
Potential Avenues for an “Euronuke”
Several academics, analysts, and supporters of a potential European nuclear deterrent have discussed how (or whether) a potential European nuclear arsenal or launch command chain could be materialized. As noted earlier, nuclear weapons are already a reality on European soil: NATO keeps 150 to 240 US warheads in the six military bases in the above-mentioned NATO member states (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung/Bonn International Center for Conversion, n.d.). France, the only EU member with such weapons (Ahmatović 2024), has, as of early 2023, 290 warheads, while the United Kingdom, now a former EU member, has around 225 (Kristensen et al. 2023).
Arguments and discussions on whether France could engage in some form of nuclear sharing that emulates the US deployment model in Europe are notable (Horovitz & Wachs 2023; Sauter 2024). This proposal is permissible to a limited degree if it does not contradict international treaties. Under nuclear-sharing schemes such as the American, which pre-date the NPT, "the host country provides the required deployment technology, mainly fighter jets that are capable of transporting and dropping nuclear weapons". However, the final say in the form of control remains within the nuclear state’s chain of command (Sauter 2024). Historically, the US played this role, but in the case of a hypothetical EU nuclear deterrence force, it would be France.
The Specter of Proliferation and Further Obstacles
Given these suggestions for a European nuclear deterrent force and their potential viability, several legal and political obstacles block these possible avenues. As all EU states adhere to the NPT, the nuclear sharing proposal would then be illegal under international law. This position is defended by Philipp Sauter, Research Fellow at the Max-Planck-Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law in Heidelberg, who argued that per the NPT's Article I “France is not allowed to transfer nuclear weapons with any recipient. The use of the word “recipient” includes not only states but also supranational organizations such as the EU. The signatories of the NPT are also not allowed to transfer the control of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon states (i.e., every state that is not the US, the UK, France, Russia, or China).” (Sauter, 2024).
Another obstacle is the command and control of any EU nuclear deterrent force. Franziska Stärk (cited in Joyner 2024), a researcher from the Peace Research and Security Policy Institute at the University of Hamburg has observed that implementing a chain of command for a potential multinational EU could be difficult. It can be argued that the current scope of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) would not allow for a military chain of command (Sauter 2024).
Technological interoperability issues, such as the nuclear delivery mechanism, are another problem. Regarding suggestions that France and Germany work on equipping their joint Future Combat Air System (FCAS) and the German F-35 dual capable fighters with French nuclear weapons (Laxande et al. 2024), "political differences and the lack of technical certification" (Horovitz & Wachs 2023, 4) constitute present obstacles. Still, the new FCAS would be the best option, even if it will not enter service until at least 2040 (Horovitz & Wachs 2023).
What Options for an EU Nuclear Deterrence?
Several downsides to a potential EU nuclear force become apparent at this point, but these do not necessarily discard any possibility of EU strategic deterrence. Despite the unlikeliness of nuclear sharing, France could, for instance, allow allies to participate in complementary tasks and capability-building exercises with the French nuclear deterrent force so they become familiar with them (Horowitz & Wachs 2023).
Given the divisions in the EU's common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and those surrounding nuclear deterrence, NATO remains a unifying structure, allowing for extended deterrence commitments (Horovitz & Wachs 2023). Atlantic Council authors Jacques Lanxade, Denis MacShane, Margarita Mathiopoulos, and Klaus Naumann (2024) argue that "only a trilateral British, French, and German nuclear umbrella, combined with a US umbrella, all under the command and control of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), can guarantee credible deterrence" (Lanxade et al. 2023).
Consequently, NATO is arguably the most plausible framework for cooperation between EU and non-EU European states, such as the UK (Joyner 2024). At a minimum, NATO arrangements could act as a stopgap until a comprehensive EU strategic deterrence force is developed.
Limitations and Risks of Nuclear Deterrence
Although developing a nuclear deterrent could reduce the EU's reliance on the US for defense and strengthen its strategic autonomy, it is crucial to analyze its potential risks. Historically, nuclear deterrence has relied on the threat of nuclear use to shape political dynamics. It is based on the assumption that a credible threat of nuclear retaliation will prevent conflicts between nuclear powers (Senn 2017). However, the limitations of nuclear deterrence theories were demonstrated by the Russian aggression towards Ukraine. As a nuclear-weapon state, Russia launched an attack on a non-nuclear-weapon state, threatening to employ nuclear weapons in response to any other country that supports Ukraine in protecting itself.
Furthermore, there are numerous risks inherent to the use of nuclear weapons. Technological advancements, particularly in digital technologies, can potentially render nuclear arms control more challenging, thereby increasing the probability of nuclear escalation (Egeland & Pelopidas 2021). Additionally, new technologies like deep fakes increase the risk of nuclear escalation by complicating and potentially manipulating nuclear signaling (Burford 2019).
Climate change-induced challenges, such as rising sea levels impacting nuclear installations, may further complicate their management, adding complexity and cost (Egeland/Pelopidas 2021, 244). Additionally, addressing urgent threats such as terrorism and climate change demands substantial financial resources, raising questions about budget allocation (Egeland/Pelopidas 2021, 244). Existing nuclear bases in France and the United Kingdom are likely to be affected by sea level rise, increasing the cost of retaining nuclear weapons when financial resources are needed elsewhere (Egeland/Pelopidas 2021, 244). Redirecting funds from nuclear arsenals to conventional weapons could thus increase state security (Wunderlich et al. 2022, 101).
Consequently, a considerable number of circumstances exist where the possession of nuclear weapons would be disadvantageous rather than advantageous. Global warming and environmental destruction will be far-reaching, affecting food security, economic production, and sociopolitical relations across Europe and the globe (World Economic Forum 2020). Such disruptions can potentially increase resource scarcity, undermining the cost-benefit calculations supporting the case for European nuclear arms. In the event of unmitigated global heating, there would be considerable demand for measures to combat climate change, including social welfare programs, job conversion initiatives, systems to combat extreme weather events, and procedures to address pandemics and other disruptive occurrences (Vidal 2020, cited in Egeland & Pelopidas 2021).
Furthermore, the idea that nuclear use could be beneficial in case of a conflict misses the potential global condemnation that a state could face, as well as humanitarian and environmental risks (Doyle 2016). In this line, research highlights that nuclear weapons have humanitarian and environmental consequences beyond national borders (Erästö 2023). Therefore, even a localized atomic conflict could have catastrophic global repercussions.
These examples show that there are significant risks associated with Europe's nuclear weapons that may outweigh any potential benefits. The management and maintenance of nuclear arsenals is made more difficult by technological advances and climate change, diverting important resources from more pressing problems such as environmental threats and terrorism. In addition, the serious risks associated with the use of nuclear weapons are highlighted by their environmental and humanitarian impacts of the potential use of the nuclear weapons. These arguments support the need for alternative security measures and imply that the pursuit of nuclear weapons in Europe may carry more risks than benefits.
Towards a Safer (Conventional) Europe
The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and the potential threat of Trump's return to the White House have been crucial in highlighting the EU's defense dependency on the US. These developments have led to discussions about establishing a nuclear deterrent to strengthen its strategic autonomy and reduce this reliance. However, the EU's position on nuclear deterrence is not united, and various political and legal obstacles must be addressed. The adherence of EU member states to the NPT and the participation of several members in the TPNW make nuclear sharing proposals politically and legally challenging. Moreover, the challenges posed by climate change and the significant financial burden of maintaining nuclear facilities add another layer of complexity and cost, diverting resources from addressing more immediate threats such as terrorism and climate change.
In addition, the potential for global condemnation and the humanitarian and environmental consequences of nuclear use underscore the profound risks that transcend national boundaries. Given these constraints, pursuing conventional alternative avenues to strengthen EU security and deterrence capabilities is important. These avenues could involve increasing overall military spendings in the member states, investing in joint procurement to finance military equipment, exploring the use of Eurobonds to finance collective defense projects as well as investing in innovations and advancement in conventional military technologies, including cyber defense. Such approaches would ensure compliance with international treaties while promoting a stronger and more unified European defense posture.
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This article was written as part of the YSC Fellowship 2024. For more information on this year’s fellow programme head here.
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