Advancing Autonomy: Charting the Path Towards More Autonomous European Defense
Anna Falorni, YSC Fellow 2024
Transatlantic support has long been a fundamental component of the European security framework, with the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) playing a pivotal role in European defense since its inception in 1949. With uncertainty growing around the future of US security commitment in Europe, the EU faces an essential question: is it time for a strategic shift towards more independence in European defense?
Traditionally, the EU’s defense strategy has operated under the shadow of NATO, adhering to the “three Ds” outlined in 1998 by Madeline Albright – avoiding duplicating efforts, decoupling from NATO’s integrated command, and discriminating between EU and non-EU members of NATO (Drent, 2018). Recent geopolitical shifts, notably Russia's invasion of Ukraine and escalating US-China tensions, compel the EU to reassess and modernize its defense strategy. At present, defense policy remains primarily within the purview of individual EU member states, a setup unsuitable to handle the security challenges facing Europe. What is more, it risks holding Europe back from being perceived as a unitary and relevant player at a time when the world seems to inevitably be heading towards growing tensions. Greater independence in the defense of Europe can be achieved by addressing two key factors: enhancing operational capabilities and strengthening the European defense industrial base. Minilateral defense initiatives offer a pathway to improve EU operational abilities, while further incentivising the development of a common European defense industrial base can foster even greater integration and efficiency.
(c) Bild von Deniz Anttila auf Pixabay
Building Operational Abilities: Minilateral Defense
Despite the EU’s growing ambitions, NATO continues to play a crucial role in the coordination of European defense in an increasingly complex threat environment, particularly due to its established institutional framework and operational know-how. Both organizations recognize the need for collaboration, as evidenced by their third Joint Declaration on EU-NATO cooperation signed in January 2023. The EU’s development plans are ambitious but necessary and time-sensitive: rather than creating a system that replaces NATO, the EU’s most efficient approach would be to build capabilities that complement NATO’s strengths. Nevertheless, the EU should continue to prioritize building increasing agency in European defense, even if it means partially breaking away from Albright’s “three Ds.”
A possible solution to limit redundancies while still building EU capabilities outside of the NATO framework can be found in the promotion of EU-coordinated minilateral initiatives. Minilateral groupings, composed of three or more countries working together, offer the obvious benefit of being more efficient, as they can be created ad hoc to respond to specific security concerns and can thus bypass the coordination issues that impair the speed and range of actions attainable in multilateral settings. The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) framework is the EU’s flagship project for defense cooperation. It has showcased the potential but also the challenges of minilateral collaboration at European level. While PESCO projects have proven to be successful in fields such as cybersecurity and military mobility, others have fallen short of expectations, due to delays and coordination issues (Pugnet, 2023). Although not a perfect solution, minilaterals remain a valid option for the EU to build capabilities and deterrence. However, such initiatives should always be understood as part of a broader strategy, and should neither preclude strengthening coordination with NATO nor prevent prioritizing greater integration at the defense industrial level.
A Common European Defense Industrial Base
There is an undeniable need to pool resources and coordinate efforts in order to quickly build the necessary capabilities for addressing the changing security environment in Europe and beyond. Duplication of efforts and fragmentation result in more than 154 different types of weapons being in use in the European Union, compared to 24 in the United States (Hartley, 2023). The need for greater coordination can only be met if greater interoperability is achieved between European armies. Moreover, the failure to exploit scale economies, making production too expensive to sustain, has led to an overt reliance on US-made equipment (Alvarez-Couceiro, 2023). In his Sorbonne speech in April 2024, French President Macron advocated for a stronger European technological and industrial sovereignty (Macron, 2024). The EU has a strong track record when it comes to economic integration: applying this prowess to the defense sector could serve as a crucial foundation for broader, more integrated defense capabilities, and greater interoperability between European armies.
The European Defense Industrial Strategy, unveiled in 2023, aims to address the issue of industrial integration in the defense sector, and has the stated objective to “strengthen the competitiveness and readiness of the European Defense Technological and Industrial Base” (European Commission, 2024). The Strategy follows previous policy initiatives meant to bolster the European defense industrial base, namely the European Defense Fund (EDF), the Coordinated Annual Review of Defense (CARD), and the aforementioned PESCO.
Despite policy efforts, the potential for further defense integration within the EU encounters significant hurdles that challenge its feasibility. According to Hartley (2023), the failure of European defense plans to deliver is often attributable to a lack of trust, freeriding, and nationalism. Addressing these issues is therefore essential for successful EU defense integration. Policymakers should consider the introduction of a European Defense Integration Index, which could offer a transparent and quantifiable measure of each country’s contribution and participation in joint defense efforts. By issuing public reports and rankings, and offering rewards to best performers, the EU could use the Index as an additional policy tool to revitalize its defense industry.
The Road to Greater Integration
Substantial transatlantic support to Europe may no longer be taken for granted: if the European Union wants to stand “on its own,” it is time to take further steps towards greater defense integration. Bolstering operational cooperation through minilateral initiatives should be a key priority in the short term, to pave the way towards greater defense coherence between EU members. A stronger Europe will not only be able to better protect its neighborhood, but it will also prove as a valuable ally for the United States. Enhanced European engagement in other regions like the Indo-Pacific could alleviate the US’s burden, thereby freeing up more resources for Europe’s Eastern flank. The conditions to achieve such independence are manifold: while not effective as a standalone, a strong political will, and leaders that understand the importance of working together and adopting a unitary strategic posture despite diverging interests, are essential to make the changes Europe needs to face the emerging challenges of the present and future.
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This article was written as part of the YSC Fellowship 2024. For more information on this year’s fellow programme head here.
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