The European Sky Shield Initiative as a Blueprint for a Future European Security Structure
Can Senel, YSC Fellow 2024
The shift of the American strategic direction from Europe to East Asia has been in the making for more than the last ten years. Although this development should have raised awareness of the weaknesses of European security, it was only with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine that the European capitals found common ground with regard to the threat perception and vision for the future direction of European security. The establishment of the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) represents a useful starting point to think about the role and nature of an improved European security structure in the future. ESSI marks a notable change in European defense cooperation and autonomy, and the initiative has the potential to become a blueprint for future strategic autonomy and continental cooperation.
(c) Image by Reto Scheiwiller from Pixabay
Zeitenwende
American priorities were already shifting before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The US started to move its global military presence for the first time since the end of the Second World War, prioritizing East Asia President Trump’s America First policy initiated a major shift back toward isolationism, which was partly followed and even complemented by the succeeding Democratic administration. Despite this dynamic, the U.S. continued to be a major actor in arms exports, increasing its exports between 2017 and 2021 by fifteen percent compared to the preceding five years (SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 2024). European nations were aware of the changing American tides, but the European institutions were not adapting militarily to the new reality. Consequently, the average military expenditure in the EU only increased slightly after Trump’s election, still remaining below NATO’s two-percent threshold (SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, 2024). Moreover, there was no meaningful attempt to find an alternative to the decreasingly reliable transatlantic military support. Instead, the trend of reliance on NATO and the United States continued.
Europe had experienced more regional conflicts involving Russia in the Caucasus, Eastern Ukraine, Crimea, and Moldova prior to February 24. However, the magnitude of the Russian invasion of Ukraine created a critical juncture that the German Chancellor Scholz called a Zeitenwende, a turning point. This point, coinciding with Washington’s policy changes further clarified which direction this moment would take the continent. Europe finally realized that adaptation to the new transatlantic reality became a necessity to be able to secure its continuity.
European Initiatives as the Key for a New Security Architecture
Meanwhile, the public support for increased security expenditures surged. Four out of five people in the EU believed that cooperation in defense matters in the Union should be increased (European Commission, 2023). Although the support for one common integrated European army was still unpopular, it still gained popularity in most European countries after the Russian invasion (Smith, 2022). Institutionally, the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was having a hard time coming to a consensus prior to the invasion. Former minister of state for foreign affairs of Germany Niels Annen, for example, has criticized the hesitancy and the lack of use of qualified majority voting (QMV) as an alternative to unanimity on the EU’s CFSP since it made most decisions impossible to make (Annen, 2020). Although these issues seem to be resolved after February 24, the time for unity in times of crises tends to be temporary, unless more profound institutional changes are made.
The change, in the shape of the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI), was first hinted at by Scholz two months before its official foundation and half a year after the Russian invasion. Chancellor Scholz acknowledged that Europe was lacking behind “when it comes to defense against airborne and space-based threats” and underlined the importance of joint European defense and the development of air defense systems for Europe as a whole, proving the realization of concern throughout the continent (Scholz, 2022). Then in October 2022, the ESSI was established by fifteen European nations and expanded to twenty-one countries within less than two years (Vieth, 2022).
The German-led intracontinental initiative comprises two non-NATO members and four non-EU members. On top of ensuring greater security, this can lead to further expansion of the initiative, further increasing unity within the continent. Moreover, an integrated defense network and joint development of new and better defense systems can make the process of catching up for Europe faster, cheaper, and more efficient (Monaghan and Christianson, 2023).
On the other hand, even though the ESSI allows and encourages joint development of new air and missile defense capabilities, it has been criticized for not having enough focus on the use of European defense systems. One example is the procurement of the American Patriot and the American-Israeli Arrow 3, where money is spent on the procurement efforts of non-European systems instead of European research and development. Furthermore, France and Italy, among other European nations, refused to follow Berlin’s leadership and join the initiative, citing the lack of usage of continental alternatives for defense systems, such as the Franco-Italian SAMP/T, as one of the main reasons (Arnold & Arnold, 2023).
The Balance of Future Initiatives
The initiative tried to find the balance between pure continental autonomy and transatlantic collaboration with a mixture of European and non-European defense systems. It was successful in not further alienating the US but failed to maintain unity within the continent. Germany’s miscalculation could shed some light on the prospect of future initiatives and find a better middle ground by learning from the mistakes of the ESSI. A potential future European Sea Defense Initiative can include French and Italian ships and American submarines on top of other vessels from other European nations, without any significant German contributions due to its high involvement in ESSI. This alternative middle ground can lead to less alienation and make previously alienated nations join other initiatives and reintegrate them into the European security structure. Conversely, to achieve continental autonomy, Europe must find a better compromise than alienating one member at a time. It needs to take a risk and lower its procurement from outside sources, and tip the scale in its favor instead of trying to balance it. For ESSI, this could succeed by switching from American Patriot to Franco-Italian SAMP/T, as both are somewhat substitutable long-range defense systems (Jones et al., 2024).
Diversified leadership of future initiatives would also decrease the discontent of German leadership and the alienation that came with it. Other nations need to step up and lead these new initiatives, not as alternatives to current initiatives but to complement the areas that the continent lacks the most. The inclusion of more non-EU and non-NATO members in these initiatives could increase interdependence within the continent and integrate them into the Union and the Organization, resulting in unexpected but welcomed political gains. Besides the potential political gains of such integration efforts, the division of labor within these initiatives would lead to further economic and military gains, as ESSI has already demonstrated. Nevertheless, the action Germany took appears to be a step in the right direction. It decreases intercontinental dependency without hurting the legitimacy of the Alliance. Going forward, Europeans should create more such initiatives, include more non-EU and non-NATO members, and diversify its leadership to combat the issue of alienation and strengthen its security architecture.
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This article was written as part of the YSC Fellowship 2024. For more information on this year’s fellow programme head here.
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