Why Proliferation isn’t the Only Path for EU Nuclear Policy
Robin Staes-Polet, YSC Fellow 2024
At present, the nuclear dimension of European security appears deeply entrenched in the status quo inherited from the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. Nonetheless, recent events, from a significant escalation of perceived threats due to Russia's invasion of Ukraine to a loss of confidence in security guarantees stemming from Donald Trump's questioning of NATO’s mutual defense clause, have the potential to shake things up and change this status quo. These developments have ignited fierce debate, particularly in Germany, regarding the potential necessity of European strategic autonomy over nuclear weapons.
In the contemporary geopolitical landscape, the complex issue of nuclear weapons and deterrence in the European Union (EU) necessitates a multi-faceted and future-oriented approach that upholds the principles of regional security and nuclear stability. Therefore, instead of driving the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons within the EU, a more sustainable option for France would be to adapt its nuclear partnerships, providing a stable basis for a new European security framework focused on defense cooperation and developing non-nuclear capabilities to tackle emerging security threats and ensure regional security and stability.
The Problematic Pursuit of European Nuclear Armament
At first glance, the most straightforward route to European strategic nuclear autonomy consists of increasing the number of nuclear-capable states in Europe, for instance by facilitating German nuclear arms procurement. Advocates of nuclear armament, from German and European politicians to foreign policy wonks, argue for enhanced European deterrence capabilities to combat a deteriorating security situation directly amidst weakened US guarantees (Euronews 2024; Lanxade et al. 2023; Vela & Camut 2024).
However, the international legal framework surrounding the acquisition of nuclear weapons complicates the issue. In terms of international reputation, such a move would immediately undermine the EU's credibility as a non-proliferation advocate in nuclear negotiations, such as those exemplified by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), where both the EU and Germany played a crucial part as negotiators (Adebahr, 2024). It would be inherently hypocritical for them to insist on non-proliferation while simultaneously becoming proliferators themselves, potentially setting a dangerous precedent for other states. Furthermore, the development of genuine European nuclear weapons would conflict with the EU's commitments to non-proliferation and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), as outlined in policy commitments such as the EU’s strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (European Council, 2003). For Germany, acquiring nuclear weapons would require withdrawing from the NPT, thus undermining the international nuclear control regime it seeks to preserve.
Beyond the challenges of EU nuclear weapons procurement under international law, the pursuit of new nuclear armaments inherently presents numerous risks, including political capital expended in facing opposition from disarmament advocates, the potential for disastrous nuclear accidents on European soil, and the inescapable environmental damage incurred from testing (Pelopidas, 2024). Furthermore, these risks must be weighed against the questionable actual strategic utility of nuclear arsenals in contemporary deterrence tactics. Due to the increased complexity of modern security threats, more and more domains emerge, such as cyber warfare and terrorism, in which nuclear weapons do not effectively deter. This suggests that nuclear proliferation within the EU would not substantially enhance regional security in the face of growing unconventional threats (Erästö 2023). Additionally, the devastating consequences of nuclear conflict, including widespread civilian casualties and environmental damage, raise doubts about the practicality and desirability of relying heavily on nuclear deterrence.
Hence, the question of German or European nuclear armament raises profound ethical, legal, and strategic considerations. While advocates argue for enhanced deterrence capabilities, the pursuit of nuclear weapons within the EU would likely undermine regional security, erode international norms, and face significant legal, political, and ethical hurdles.
The Limits of French-EU Nuclear Sharing
Intra-EU nuclear weapons sharing, a more novel proposal, could see French weapons being shared amongst EU states. These agreements could be modeled on the existing arrangements between the US and several NATO members, which involve the deployment of US nuclear weapons in host countries while retaining final control within the US chain of command (Masters & Merrow, 2023). Due to their pre-existence before the NPT (Mattelaer 2021) and ultimate US control over the weapons, NATO interprets these agreements as compatible with the treaty, despite persistent criticism from outside the alliance (Kristensen 2005). Again, they argue that nuclear sharing runs counter to the principles of the NPT, undermining the global non-proliferation regime championed by the EU. Moreover, the French nuclear doctrine of “strict sufficiency” has limited its arsenal to under 300 warheads (Granholm & Rydqvist 2018), paling in comparison to the nuclear superpowers and would be left weaker if dispatched to other EU states.
In addition, any sharing of French nuclear weapons would be precluded by states party to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) (Sauter 2024). Within the EU, Ireland, Austria, and Malta are signatories to this treaty, prohibiting support for nuclear weapons deployment. Additionally, the use or threat of nuclear weapons and any assistance towards such actions are forbidden under the TPNW. Withdrawal from the treaty is possible but requires extraordinary circumstances and a one-year notice period. Moreover, these states cannot vote for EU financial contributions to the French nuclear weapons program without unanimous Council approval, presenting further obstacles.
Towards a Strong Foundation: Reshaping Nuclear Partnerships
Nonetheless, there are possible methods to restructure nuclear partnerships in order to strengthen the joint EU nuclear deterrent effect while avoiding the pitfalls of alternative approaches. One option is to extend the French nuclear umbrella to cover EU states. France could do this by unilaterally declaring its willingness to use nuclear weapons in response to an invocation of a mutual defense clause by an EU member state, such as Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty or Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union (Sauter 2024). However, this commitment is expected to limit French autonomy and independence in the nuclear domain it so prizes. Doubts also persist regarding France's willingness to accept the destruction of its own country to defend its allies, especially given France’s uncertain policy towards Russia and its limited nuclear options (Horovitz & Wachs 2023). To address these doubts and enhance credibility in responding to limited aggression, France would need to expand and diversify its nuclear arsenal by abandoning its policy of minimum deterrence and producing warheads with lower yields for tactical purposes. Already possessing one of the most modern nuclear arsenals, France’s measures would bolster the credibility of its deterrence capabilities and play a crucial role in buttressing the emerging European strategic architecture.
A less costly and more practical option for France is to join the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), the alliance’s collective political control structure of nuclear weapons (NATO 2022). By abandoning its pure focus on strategic independence, France could adopt a more collective stance in the face of growing security threats and the leadership vacuum left by the United States in Europe. This could foster increased cooperation with the US, keeping it invested in European security. More importantly, this step could help to align French and British nuclear strategy and posture more closely as well as to reassure European states about the effectiveness of their alliance and collective nuclear deterrence (Horovitz & Wachs 2023). Despite possessing a smaller and less diversified nuclear arsenal compared to the US, the proximity and identity of France and the UK as European nuclear powers contribute to the credibility of its extended deterrent (Granholm & Rydqvist 2018). In reshaping global and regional nuclear partnerships, these two options offer a more robust approach to enhancing overall European security while adhering to the non-proliferation goals of the NPT.
Focusing on Emerging Security Challenges
With France extending its nuclear umbrella or joining the NPG, EU states can collectively focus on enhancing non-nuclear deterrence capabilities, fuelled by increased defense spending commitments. EU states can pick an integrated approach to defense, forging a comprehensive security framework under the already existing Permanent Structured Cooperation.
Prime drivers of this integrated approach are strategic projected needs-based procurement initiatives like the EU Coordinated Annual Review on Defense, which can be focused on addressing a wide array of shared security threats. Most saliently, emerging security challenges, spanning cyber-attacks, disinformation, and threats to critical infrastructure, necessitate a security framework that transcends traditional nuclear deterrence. By prioritizing and coordinating investments in these fields, the EU can cultivate a resilient defense posture capable of confronting multifaceted security threats.
Ultimately, such procurement integration could possibly pave the way for the establishment of a joint European defense force, further strengthening the EU's capacity to address emerging security challenges. These steps bolster European security without resorting to nuclear proliferation and therefore ensure alignment with non-proliferation objectives while also fostering a unified stance on security and defense within the EU.
Forging a Sustainable Path for European Security
As the EU contemplates its approach to nuclear weapons and deterrence, it must recognize that the proliferation of nuclear arms within its member states is not a sustainable solution to contemporary security challenges. Instead, reframing nuclear partnerships, through a French nuclear umbrella or NATO’s NPG, would allow EU member states to streamline their efforts to focus on non-traditional security challenges, offering more pragmatic avenues for ensuring stability and security in Europe. By adhering to international non-proliferation norms and fostering cooperation among member states, the EU can develop a comprehensive and adaptive security framework that addresses both traditional and emerging threats. This approach not only aligns with the principles of non-proliferation but also ensures that Europe can navigate the complexities of the modern geopolitical landscape with both prudence and foresight.
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This article was written as part of the YSC Fellowship 2024. For more information on this year’s fellow programme head here.
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