Fractured Unity: Understanding Franco-German Tensions in EU Security Policy
Charlotte Nachtmann, YSC Fellow 2024
“How broken is the Franco-German engine?” (Gotev 2024), “Tensions entre la France et l’Allemagne: pourquoi le tandem moteur de l’Europe bat de l’aile” (Lucet 2022). Headlines like these have been omnipresent in European newspapers in recent years. The area of European integration in which the Franco-German disagreements have become most evident is the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). President Emmanuel Macron and Chancellor Olaf Scholz are struggling to find a common vision for the role of the EU on the international stage as well as a common voice on pressing geopolitical and security issues. This raises many questions: What is the source of these ongoing disagreements between France and Germany? What is their impact on the CSDP and what are the broader consequences of the bilateral struggle? Most of the bilateral divergences can be traced back to different strategic cultures in France and Germany, which inhibit the EU’s security and defense integration, especially when it comes to practical implementation. Consequently, the EU lacks legitimate leadership in security terms and a coherent strategy for its actions on the international stage.
The Burden of Strategic Culture
When trying to understand the major reasons behind the Franco-German disputes and misunderstandings in European security policy, it all comes down to different strategic cultures. These include ideas, norms, learned behavior patterns, perception modes, and historical experiences that shape the socialization of the respective security elites, often leading to entrenched positions (Giegerich 2006, 36-40; Lantis/Howlett 2016, 84-101; Siedschlag 2014, 25-36). The differences in strategic culture not only cause Franco-German disagreement. They directly impact EU integration by generating divergent visions for the CSDP. France identifies itself as a military power: This includes a high value placed on military capabilities, the will and the ambition to shape international affairs (if necessary unilaterally), a strong adherence to national sovereignty claims, and a pragmatic relationship to security institutions. Following de Gaulle's idea of an "Europe puissance", France is aiming to extend this national security and defense culture to the European level in the concept of a "Europe de la défense". It also seeks to reassert French interests worldwide through Europe as a “power multiplier” (Treacher 2021). Germany's strategic culture, however, is shaped by the mindset of a “civilian power” (Maull 2007), even after the widely publicized “Zeitenwende”: a preference for civilian instead of military means, a reluctance to assume international leadership, voluntary and identity-forming integration into fixed systems of collective security, and a rejection of strategic solo efforts. Berlin is therefore pursuing a consensus-based, inclusive, civilian, and NATO-linked course in the CSDP.
Despite the cultural differences between Germany and France, both countries are aware of the EU’s need for internal leadership and their own dependence on the EU as a stepping stone to international relevance. This is why they have always been able to find compromises so far. At the outset of each integrative step in the CSDP, a compromise between Berlin and Paris has emerged: One example is the establishment of the Franco-German Brigade in 1989 that developed to be the Eurocorps. Another more recent example is the Franco-German defense initiative aiming for a “Renewal of the CSDP” from 2016 (Wissenschaftliche Dienste des Deutschen Bundestages 2017, 6). In its aftermath, several CSDP-instruments have been created: the European Defence Fund (EDF), the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) and the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). In addition, the European Peace Facility was introduced without any visible Franco-German conflict, enabling €11.1 billion to be mobilized between 2022 and 2024 to support the Ukrainian armed forces (European Council 2024). One could argue that European security integration has rapidly developed in recent years and that the Franco-German engine has encountered no obstacles in deciding on further structural development of the CSDP.
Varieties of Engagement
The real problem lies in the active utilization of the CSDP instruments after their implementation. For example, the EU Battle Groups have never been deployed in operation since their creation in 2005. In practical stress tests, the CSDP has repeatedly failed, a problem that can be traced back to the different strategic cultures in France and Germany. The bilateral compromise aims at an integrated security approach, characterized by a combination of civilian and military elements (Council of the EU 2022, 13). As a civil-military actor, the EU could potentially develop an international standing that clearly distinguishes it from other actors by being capable of a broad spectrum of missions. However, in practice, the EU does not fulfill this ambition. Of the current 24 missions, only one is distinctly civilian and military (EU External Action 2024). Moreover, where the EU intends to intervene militarily, it has not yet proven itself as a competent player. For instance, in Mali, active counter-terrorism efforts were provided not by the EU, but by France through the unilateral missions Serval and Barkhane. The EU's role was limited to leading a military training mission, explicitly excluding combat operations (EU External Action 2023). The only European combat participation was provided by Task Force Takuba – a coalition of the willing that operated outside the CSDP's command. In this scenario, the EU did not emerge as a unified and militarily capable actor, but rather as a civil appendage to a French-dominated intervention.
Another example for the differing engagement levels is the fact that France coordinates 17 PESCO projects, whereas Germany leads only eleven (PESCO 2024). However, France's willingness to take the lead does not necessarily make it a role model, as Paris often pushes boundaries, which can offend Germany. For instance, in the project of the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) France not only assumed leadership but also attempted to overstep Germany financially without granting sufficient co-determination (Masala et al. 2020, 54:45; Brink 2021; Vogel 2020). Given the inconsistencies in FCAS, which have almost led to its failure multiple times, one might be relieved that it is not a PESCO project. The issue of leadership disparity between France and Germany also manifests itself when France rushes ahead with initiatives like the European Intervention Initiative or, more recently, with ideas on European boots on the ground in Ukraine. Germany's reaction ranges from restraint over outright rejection to ostentatious indifference.
The Vicious Circle of Mutual Frustration
The Franco-German deadlock – especially between Chancellor Scholz and President Macron – is creating a vicious circle. France repeatedly breaks out unilaterally and allows CSDP initiatives to fizzle out if they do not serve French interests. France was also disappointed with the institutional results of PESCO, which Paris intended to be an exclusive format for willing and capable EU member states. Ultimately, however, Germany prevailed with an inclusive and integrative approach while maintaining strong ties to NATO. Frustrated, Macron launched the European Intervention Initiative in 2017, an informal, non-binding forum outside the EU structures focusing on intervention capabilities.
Instead of creating new cooperation formats outside the EU, Germany is once again turning towards NATO and the security provider USA in response to a stagnating CSDP and the geostrategic threat posed by Russia. Shortly after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the German government decided to purchase American F35A fighter jets from the US to maintain nuclear sharing within NATO. The purely European FCAS was no longer awaited. In 2023, Berlin decided to station an entire brigade on NATO's eastern flank in Lithuania. These decisions are understandable, as NATO, not the EU, is responsible for collective defense. NATO offers more experience, established planning structures, and the support of the USA. Moreover, the EU has repeatedly committed itself not to duplicate NATO structures (General Secretariat of the Council 2009, 9; Michel/von der Leyer/Stoltenberg 2023). Nevertheless, Germany is once again clearly rejecting Emmanuel Macron's call for European strategic autonomy, relegating the EU to a defense policy supplicant and thus manifesting the country’s underlying strategic culture.
The Implausible Driving Force
The personal incompatibility between Macron and Scholz constitutes disastrous publicity for the EU and exposes fundamental sluggishness, lack of strategy and a leadership deficit within the CSDP. In Mali, France intervened first, with the EU following only in a supporting role. The EU mission EUNAVFOR Aspides, aimed at securing the trade routes in the Red Sea against attacks by Houthi rebels, was launched months after the US-led coalition Operation Prosperity Guardian (in which France was involved from the outset).
The divergent strategic and cultural visions that Germany and France seek to impose on the CSDP hinder the EU from formulating a clear strategy, establishing a security policy profile, and developing its own strategic culture. Consequently, the Franco-German duo appears as an implausible driving force for European security integration. Besides, it is debatable whether these two Western states alone can or should determine the direction of the CSDP’s future evolution. The emergence of new centers of powers amongst the Eastern European member states might lead to a necessary rebalancing, which could also help to overcome the limits and inherent contradictions of the idea of the Franco-German engine as a unifying driving force.
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This article was written as part of the YSC Fellowship 2024. For more information on this year’s fellow programme head here.
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