The Future of Enlargement: Charting a Credible Road Map Now and Embracing the Western Balkans

Jul 26

Antonie Blumberg, YSC Fellow 2024

As the European Union (EU) contemplates its next wave of Eastern enlargement, it faces geopolitical and internal political challenges. On the one hand, Russian imperialism has re-energized the enlargement debate. The 2023 Enlargement Package frames EU membership as a “strategic choice” and German Foreign Minister Baerbock has called “enlargement a geopolitical necessity” (Weiland, 2024). Notably, major enlargement opponents like France have overcome their enlargement fatigue and member states with diverging strategic interests agree on the new geopolitical reality. On the other hand, internal political dynamics require the EU to navigate diverse member state interests, institutional capacities, and needed treaty reforms in light of the expected enlargement of the Union. As the European Commission stated in March 2024, “while reforms were necessary before, with enlargement they become indispensable.”

Balancing these geopolitical interests with the need for internal reforms is essential for developing a credible and strategic road map for Eastern enlargement. In order to achieve this goal, the EU should prioritize countries that chose the European path years ago, in particular the Western Balkans, whose geopolitical relevance demands utmost attention. At the same time, however, strategic reforms and a gradual merit-based accession process are paramount. By offering tangible incentives and creating a credible roadmap, the EU can reconcile its geopolitical ambitions with the necessity for internal reforms.

*This image was generated with the assistance of AI.*

Embracing Geopolitical Imperatives in the Western Balkans

Despite Ukraine’s undeniable strategic importance to the EU, the geopolitical relevance of the Western Balkans must not be overlooked. Several Western Balkan countries applied for EU membership over 15 years ago, transposing reforms and affirming their European orientation. However, in contemporary discourse, the Western Balkans often appear to be regarded as less significant compared to Ukraine, Moldova, or Georgia. During the 2023 EU Summit, discussions overwhelmingly focused on Ukraine’s fast-tracked membership candidacy, overshadowing the ongoing efforts of the Western Balkans. Also, member states like Estonia, Sweden, Poland and Belgium prioritize Ukraine’s EU accession over the other candidate countries due to their own geographical priorities (Buras & Morina, 2023).

Yet, the Balkans are a prominent case where instability and the influence of third countries are increasing, making the region even more geopolitically important. Particularly worrying is Serbia’s drift towards Russia. Russian disinformation campaigns and influence over the media are destabilizing primarily Serbia but also impacting the Republic of Srpska in Bosnia. A credible EU prospect could undermine separatism within Bosnia and eventually incentivize Serbia and Kosovo to resolve their dispute. In 2023, tensions between Serbia and Kosovo escalated and the rhetoric remains inflammatory. The European Stability Initiative (ESI) has repeatedly warned of the potential for further outbreaks of violence and urged for increased diplomatic engagement (ESI, 2023). However, EU led mediation between Kosovo and Serbia based on the promise of accession will continue to fail as long as the promise lacks credibility. Serbia is heavily stuck in the accession process and Kosovo is not even able to apply for it.

Moreover, the recent victory of the right-wing VMRO-DPMNE party in North Macedonia confirms a trend of increasing EU skepticism (Stamouli, 2024). Letting the Western Balkans drift not only towards Russia but also China, Iran and Turkey cannot be in the EU’s interest. Therefore, framing EU Eastern enlargement as a geopolitical imperative must include making violence and instability unthinkable in the Western Balkans. This can only be done by materializing promises of European integration.

Preparing for Enlargement

Besides carefully balancing between the post-Soviet spheres and the Western Balkans, the EU must recognize the interconnected nature of enlargement and institutional reforms. This approach even entails a win-win: Eastern member states opposing treaty reform are incentivized to compromise whereas enlargement opponents are motivated by a better-functioning EU. Thereby, reforms must be twofold: Whilst candidate countries must commit to reforms to meet the accession criteria, especially in the field of the rule of law, the EU must prepare internally for the accession, especially concerning the decision-making process.

There is overarching consensus among member states that the rule of law criterion is non-negotiable (Buras & Morina, 2023). Negative experiences with the erosion of the rule of law during previous accessions underscore the need for internal reforms in candidate countries before accession, ruling out fast-track enlargement. Unfortunately, progress on the 35 policy negotiation areas has stagnated in recent years. One reason for this is the EU’s inability to offer credible incentives to candidate states to pursue reforms. In order to move away from this standstill, the costs incurred by countries implementing profound reforms and aligning with the EU’s acquis must be acknowledged. Progress stalls when accession realities are constantly undermined by individual member states’ vetoes and fail to materialize. Enticing incentives other than an “accession-someday” are absent. Furthermore, credibility diminishes when considering that Ukraine and Moldova attained candidate status without meeting the requirements imposed on other candidates.

The second area revolves around the question of whether Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) should extensively replace the unanimity requirement. The EU faced serious challenges during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine when Hungary alone could block decisions. With potentially 37 member states, reaching consensus becomes even more challenging. Moreover, bilateral disputes often led member states to use their veto powers in the accession process, resulting in detrimental delays. Countries including Germany, Belgium, France, Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain, and Romania advocate for QMV (German Federal Foreign Office, 2023). However, smaller and especially eastern members express concerns about losing their veto rights (Szynkowski vel Sek, 2023). They further argue that without consensus, the Union’s unity would be undermined. Given the discrepancy between the two sides and the requirement for unanimous treaty changes, change in this area is deemed unfeasible.

Moving Forward Instead of a Deadlock

After assessing these reform areas, it is evident that prioritizing reforms over enlargement could indefinitely postpone enlargement. Whether treaty change will occur remains uncertain. Thus, one must get comfortable with the idea that enlargement might happen without reforms. Hence, recognizing that the current institutional setup already offers some flexibility is crucial. What can still be done without treaty reform?

First, the EU needs a clear and unified direction. Until now, Von der Leyen did not mention specific timelines for enlargement. With the newly elected Parliament and the new Commissioner for enlargement this policy area must be prioritized. Staged accession of states based on merit could be considered, contrary to the proposal of differentiated integration, which would undermine unity and cohesion. Alongside gradual accession, new Copenhagen criteria need to be formalized. They should fasten the EU’s decision-making process and commit candidates fully to the rule of law with a strengthened conditionality mechanism. Thereby, implementing QMV in the accession process to close and open new chapters could help eliminate absurd bilateral disputes (Emerson, 2014). This change would require merely a simple council decision.

To maintain candidates motivated until formal accession, the EU should offer other incentives like participation in the single market and green agenda, access to the EU budget and observer status by the year 2030 if certain criteria are met. Moreover, it is alarming that the 2024 Growth Plan for the Western Balkans is not explicitly linked to the formal accession process. Whereas the European Commission advocates for a gradual accession based on merits for all candidates, the staged accession methodology is excluded from the growth plan (European Commission, 2024). This should be addressed promptly to avoid a credibility gap.

In the long run, more drastic reforms regarding Article 7, a new court for judicial coherence, overarching QMV, and the financial framework can be considered. However, this broad outline shows that the EU could still adapt and function if enlargement happens without reforms. Eastern enlargement remains the most effective tool to counter third-country influence and instability. Prioritizing the Western Balkans and overcoming the impasse over treaty reforms is therefore essential. By developing a strategic road map, remaining flexible regarding treaty reforms, and adopting a gradual, merit-based accession process, the EU can effectively navigate the complexities arising from enlargement.

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