Franco-German and Polish Cooperation in the Shadow of the Ukraine Invasion: A Weimar Triangle Perspective
Lea Peters ( YSC Communications Manager) & Amélie Jaques-Apke (YSC Director General & Co-Founder)
Photo credit: Americahaus (c)
The Weimar Triangle, established in 1991 to facilitate Poland's integration into the European framework, has not yet fully matured into a constant mechanism for political coordination. However, the current geopolitical climate, marked by swift strategic adjustments in defence and military investments, presents an opportunity for this format to evolve into a significant political force. Although the Franco-German cooperation faces considerable challenges due to differing approaches to enhance European security, the re-election of Donald Tusk has provided new momentum to reinvigorate this forum. In this context, the Weimar Triangle could emerge as a vital strategic platform for addressing these issues. A dedicated panel discussion at the Young Security Conference covered the prospects and future challenges of the Weimar Triangle as part of the shifting European security landscape.
The Weimar Triangle serves as a critical platform for coordination and facilitation on both technical and political levels. It also offers a mechanism for Poland to communicate its defence perspectives to Germany and France, which tend to be more hesitant in their defence strategies. Essentially, the triangle enhances the diffusion of security and defence policy ideas from Eastern to Western Europe. While NATO and the EU remain primary security structures, the Triangle complements these larger frameworks by addressing specific regional security needs.
Denys Kolesnyk, a consultant and researcher in Paris, argued on the panel that the Weimar Triangle could become the new Entente of Europe by combining France’s nuclear power, Germany’s industrial strength, and Poland’s military capabilities. Eastern Europe, having recognized the Russian threat early on, is strongly committed to securing and defending the EU. France should therefore realign its focus towards the East, creating momentum for leadership in security and defence policy.
Kolesnyk noted that too few in the West have listened to Eastern experts, but a shift in perception is now underway: the West is ready to listen, presenting new opportunities for enhanced cooperation with Poland emerging as a strong voice of Eastern Europe.
The new Polish government, with its strong ties to Ukraine and the Visegrad Group, offers fresh opportunities for collaboration. Poland has significantly bolstered its military capabilities in response to the Russian threat, while Germany has been slower to react, leaving it unprepared for recent escalations. It was only after Russia’s invasion that President Macron’s administration in France began to acknowledge the security threat from Russia, increasingly relying on Eastern European security expertise. This shift provides opportunities for stronger Franco-Polish cooperation in defence.
Jochen Kleinschmidt, lecturer and researcher at the Chair of International Politics of the Technical University of Dresden, argued that there has never been a real Franco-German engine in EU security policy. He noted that other countries have always had more agency, and criticised France and Germany for moving too slowly, especially in terms of current needs and timing.
Romain Le Quiniou, Founder of the EuroCreative Think Tank, emphasised that the EU needs to be prepared on all fronts to ensure that the democratic model survives and thrives in the 21st century: the core issue is the defence of democracy, a point that has not yet been fully understood, even though time is running out.
To convince NATO of the value of defending EU and European values, Bart Kot, Programme Director of the Warsaw Security Forum, added that a critical question must be addressed: Are Germans prepared to die for Germany, for Poland and for Estonia?
Policy Recommendations
Revitalise Defense Strategies: Germany and France must adopt more realistic and immediate defence strategies to address current threats effectively. This includes reactivating production lines for essential defence articles and making strategic defence purchases that cater to near-future threats. The focus should shift from long-term projects, like developing new tanks for 2040, to immediate needs. Both countries should increase their defence spending well beyond the current 2% GDP target to prepare adequately for potential threats from Russia and the possibility of reduced U.S. support.
Enhance Cooperation and Trust within the Weimar Triangle and Toward Eastern Europe: To build trust and effective cooperation, Germany and France must demonstrate serious commitments to Poland's security concerns. This includes transparent and strategic defence policies and joint military projects that address immediate threats rather than distant future plans. Incorporating more diverse expertise, particularly from Central and Eastern European countries, is essential, as they often have a clearer understanding of Russia’s potential strategy due to their historic experience and outlook.
Strengthen NATO's Role and Capabilities: The focus should remain on strengthening NATO's role in European defence. This involves ensuring that NATO's strategies are robust and adaptable to new threats, reconsidering outdated agreements like the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and ensuring a more efficient decision-making process within NATO and the EU. The Weimar Triangle can serve as a vehicle for influencing EU and NATO policies, complementing these larger frameworks by addressing specific regional security needs. Smaller security cooperations like the Weimar Triangle are necessary to find consensus on a smaller scale before integrating these decisions into larger alliances.
Develop a Comprehensive Reserve System and Emphasise the Defense of Liberal Democracy: Instead of reintroducing conscription, countries should develop comprehensive reserve systems to utilise trained former soldiers. This approach would enhance readiness without diverting resources from immediate military needs, ensuring that military capabilities are maintained without the logistical and financial burdens of full conscription. Additionally, political leaders and the media must clearly communicate that the current geopolitical struggle is not just about peace and stability but about defending liberal democracy. It is crucial to be ready on all fronts to ensure that the vision of democracy survives.
By addressing these key issues and recommendations, the Weimar Triangle can play a pivotal role in enhancing European defence and security in the face of evolving threats and an increasingly fragmented political situation in France and Germany. The Weimar Triangle is essential for fostering consensus on regional security issues, enabling more efficient decision-making within larger alliances like the EU and NATO.
This policy brief is part of our series on the panels of the #YSC2024. To learn more about our anniversary conference click here.
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